ADF Serials Newsletter
For those interested in Australian Military Aircraft History and Serials
in this issue
-- Sabres in RAAF Service - a brief history
-- Indonesian Sabres (ex RAAF) Can you help?
-- SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 1 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
-- SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 2 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
-- Have You Ever Wondered About the Histories of Those Old Planes on TV? - Gordon B
-- A trip down Memory Lane...
-- Neptune Modifications - SARAH revealed!
-- ADF Serials New Members
-- Can you help us identify this Anson?
-- Your Feedback
-- Do you have something for us?
Welcome to our first newsletter for 2003. This month
the newsletter features the Sabre aircraft with a short
history of its service with the RAAF, a request for
information on one of the RAAF Sabres which was sold
to the Indonesian Air Force in 1973 and an accident
report involving Sabre aircraft at Quirindi NSW.
Gordon B looks at the Lockheed 12A, Sidney Cotton's
role in reconnaissance and ends with a section on plane
spotting from the comfort of your lounge chair.
There is also a walk down Memory Lane - many RAAF
bases and parks have old RAAF aircraft as static
displays? Have you looked at one and wondered about
its history? Wynnum has provided a photo of Meteor
A77-702 which was displayed outside RAAF Laverton
during the 1960's and 1970's.
If you have a photo of any military aircraft on static
display please email jan_adf-serials.com and we can
included it in the newsletter.
Last month's newsletter contained a plea about
information re SARAH. Read on to see who or what
The group also needs assistance in finding out more
about Anson VH-FIA. Can you help with details of its
Till next month
Sabres in RAAF Service - a brief history
The Sabre aircraft was brought into service with the
RAAF in 1955. The decision to replace the locally built
CAC Mustang and DHA Vampires with the Sabre was
based on its success against Russian MiG aircraft during
the Korean War. As there were no spare Sabres to
supply to the RAAF, the CAC was commissioned to build
them under licence. The locally built Sabre, based on
the design of the North American F86 Sabre, was
modified to suit local conditions. Some of the
- The installation of Rolls Royce Avon turbojet
engines and modified air intakes to accommodate the
- Revised cockpit layout
- Increased fuel capacity
- Installation of two 30mm cannons under the
cockpit instead of 6 0.5 calibre machine guns mounted
around the nose
The first Australian built Avon Sabre flew on 3 August
1953 and during its test flight, it became the first
aircraft in Australia to break the sound barrier.
75 Sqn, reformed in March 1955, took delivery of its
Sabre aircraft on 4 Apr 1955 at RAAF Williamtown. 3
Sqn received its first Sabres on 1 March 1956 and 77
Sqn on 19 November 1956. During the Malayan
Emergency, Sabres saw service in Malaysia with 3 Sqn
deployed in 1958 and 77 Sqn in 1959. Sabres flew
missions against the communist insurgents until 1960.
In 1962, a detachment (later designated 79 Sqn) of 8
Sabres deployed from Butterworth to Ubon (Thailand)
to assist with action against communist activity.
During their period of service with the RAAF, the Sabre
flew with 2OCU, 5OCU, ARDU, 3, 75, 76, 77 and 79
Sqns. The Sabre aircraft were used by the Black
Panther aerobatic team and to many, they are still
widely regarded as the best combat aircraft produced
in Australia. [Nothing beats the Mirage in my humble
In 1965 the phasing out of Sabre aircraft began as the
RAAF took delivery of the Mirage III-A. By July 1971,
the RAAF had officially retired the Sabre from service.
However, many of the Sabres continued life with other
airforces. In October 1969, ten Sabres were handed
over to the Royal Malaysian Air Force, with a further six
delivered in 1971. Additionally, in February 1973, 16
Sabres entered service with the Indonesian Air Force.
Which leads us to....
Indonesian Sabres (ex RAAF) Can you help?
Darren is looking for information on the Former RAAF ID
of the Indonesian Sabre F8623 (link to image below)
and others. If you can help please email
Click here to see image of F8623
SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 1 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
SABRE MIDAIR COLLISION
Quirindi Airfield, NSW 19 September 1964
(Article reproduced courtesy of Directorate of Flying
Safety-Air Force with special thanks to Mr John
At 1300 hrs on the 19th September 1964, four Sabre
aircraft of No 2 (Fighter) Operational Conversion Unit,
based at RAAF Williamtown, took off on a "round
robin" flypast exercise planned as part of Air Force
Week celebrations. The planned route was to take
them over nine NSW towns, including Quirindi airfield
and township, prior to returning to Williamtown. Arrival
at Quirindi was planned to coincide with a local air
pageant and would involve a number of flypasts in
various formations as part of the pageant.
The mission proceeded as planned to Quirindi (the fifth
town) where the briefed flypasts, in different
formations, was begun. At about 1403 hrs, after
completing a pass in box formation and two passes in
low level battle formation, the aircraft were called into
close formation for the final flypast.
While rejoining into close formation the No 2 aircraft,
A94-355 collided with the lead aircraft, A94-356. The
No 2 aircraft impacted the ground five seconds
after the collision killing the pilot. The lead aircraft was
only slightly damaged and landed safely at Tamworth.
The remainder of the formation returned directly to
The flight was one of a number of commitments
accepted by the RAAF as a part of Air Force Week.
However, because of urgent, unexpected operational
tasks that has arisen since accepting the flypast
commitment, No 2 (F)OCU lacked sufficient staff pilots
to fly all the Air Force Week missions as well as routine
training exercises. It was thus decided to utilise two
student members of the senior conversion course in the
flypast mission, to make up the required section of four
aircraft. One of those selected was an experienced
pilot with previous Sabre experience, who was deemed
to be the most capable of the remaining pilots on the
At the briefing, all flight members were issued with
prepared maps of the proposed route. All relevant
details, such as route to be flown, timing, anticipated
fuel consumption, reporting procedures etc were
Considerable emphasis was placed on the two types of
formation to be flown - low level battle formation and
close box formation.
The sequence to be flown over Quirindi consisted of a
flypast at 500 ft AGL in a box formation, spreading into
a low level battle formation for further passes over the
airfield, reforming again into box formation with wheels
down for a final pass, and then departure for Scone.
The leader briefed that all power changes, formation
changes, turns, use of speed brakes, and undercarriage
selections would be called over the radio. A blackboard
diagram was used to illustrate the types of formation,
positions of members in the formation, and movement
of the members of the formation during turns.
Duration of the flight was expected to be 1.25 hrs. The
weather conditions prevailing at Quirindi for the flypasts
were mainly cloudless, light winds, light turbulence and
Formation Leader: an experienced Sabre pilot with in
excess of 1 000 hrs on type. He was also an FCI.
No 2: The pilot of the No 2 (accident) aircraft had
accumulated 307 hrs total flying time, including 48 hrs
on Sabre aircraft. He had been repeatedly assessed as
an outstanding cadet during his basic training and won
the Goble Trophy for best overall pilot on his course.
During the Sabre operational conversion course he had
exhibited a great deal of natural ability and
determination. He had made good progress throughout
the course, having completed the pure conversion
segment, and was coping quite well with the more
advanced tactics phase. He had successfully covered
all aspects of tactical and close formation flying with
only minor faults.
The accident occurred two miles from Quirindi airfield
and was witnessed by some 2500 spectators at Quirindi
airfield, as well as CAA officials and others involved in
the organising of the local pageant. Other
witnesses closer to the crash location, include two
other members of the formation.
The pilot of the lead aircraft stated that as he passed
over the airfield on the second pass, he called for
speed brakes out. He was then level and also called
that he was reducing power. Shortly after, while in a
gentle 20 degree bank to starboard and climbing away
gradually, he called for "box formation go".
The leader was, by now, looking out generally, in
anticipation of initiating a left turn for the final pass
over the airfield. Suddenly he felt a noticeable bump on
his port wing and observed a shadow in his peripheral
vision. No alterations to the aircraft's handling
characteristics were noted.
Following a query from the No 3 aircraft, the leader
looked out at the port wing and confirmed that he had
been hit. On steepening up to the starboard, he saw
wreckage of A94-355 on the ground.
The pilot of the No 4 aircraft was the furthest pilot in
the formation from the two aircraft involved in the
collision, some 200 feet directly astern of his leader.
Nevertheless, he had the best view of the two
aircraft involved. He stated that moments earlier both
he and the accident pilot had delayed opening of speed
brakes to assist in catching up to the lead
aircraft. Then, while he (No 4) had begun to regulate
his closing on the lead aircraft, the No 2 aircraft had
maintained a considerable closing speed. The
pilot of the lead aircraft had, by this time, started a
gentle turn to starboard and No 2 overshot his leader
and appeared to pass slightly in front of and above
the lead aircraft. It appeared to No 4 that No 2 was
taking his aircraft to the outside of the turn to wash off
excess overtake. No 2 then banked sharply to
starboard and his starboard wingtip hit the leader's left
According to the No 4 pilot, while the lead aircraft
maintained its flight path and appeared to be
unaffected by the collision, the No 2 aircraft yawed
sharply to the right, slightly above and in front of the
lead aircraft, and about four feet of the right wing tip
broke off with other parts also shredding from the
damaged wing. The aircraft then rolled very rapidly to
the right and passed underneath the lead aircraft. As it
fell away from the formation it quickly became inverted,
with the nose pointing down.
At this point No 4 briefly lost sight of No 2. When re-
acquired the aircraft was flying straight and level
approximately 20 degrees to the left of the formation
heading and about 10 feet above ground level, in a
slightly nose up attitude, yawing slightly and travelling
parallel with the ground. It seemed that it was about to
land and, just when it appeared to be touching down,
it rolled rapidly to the right and impacted the ground on
its right wing.
The pilot of the No 3 aircraft generally confirmed this
sequence of events. Some 30 seconds after the call to
rejoin for box formation, he was moving into the
echelon left position when he noticed No 2 come
quickly into view almost immediately above the lead
aircraft. It was banked to starboard at an angle of
about 90 degrees. At this time the lead aircraft was in
a climbing turn to starboard. No 2 then appeared to roll
rapidly, slightly in front of the lead aircraft and so close
that No 3 thought their wings may have touched.
Moments later, the No 2 aircraft went inverted and
passed from view.
After A94-355 impacted the ground, progressively
disintegration of the right wing occurred and a fire
started soon after. The aircraft rolled inverted onto the
canopy area, before rolling and tumbling along the
Distribution of the wreckage was quite random and
simply indicated a high degree of disintegration and
dispersion due to speed at impact, the initial impact
angle and the rolling/tumbling progress of the aircraft
along the ground.
There was ample evidence to show that, in the final
moments, the pilot attempted ejection.
SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 2 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
From impact marks on the ground, the degree of break-
up of A94-355 and the distribution of the wreckage, it
was apparent that the right wing tip had initial
contacted the ground at fairly high speed and a low
rate of descent. The wreckage was spread along a
path 300 metres long.
As is sometimes the case in accident investigations,
physical evidence at the crash site conflicted with
what was given by eyewitnesses. In this instance, the
evidence of the No 4 pilot regarding a significant part of
A94-355's right wing separating after the midair collision
was not consistent with the evidence obtained during
the wreckage inspection. The starboard wing,
including the tip and outer section of the aileron were
still attached to the aircraft when it impacted the
In order to establish exactly what damage was inflicted
on A94-355 by the collision, and to what extent
effective control could have been maintained by the
pilot, all the recovered portions of the right wing were
collected and reconstructed. From this reconstruction,
it was established amongst other things, that:
- The right mainplane, flap and aileron, with the
exception of that part of the aileron inboard of the
aileron centre hinge and aileron jack, were still
attached to the aircraft when it crashed.
- Neither the aileron jack nor the hydraulic lines of
either the normal or alternate control systems to the
jack were damaged by the collision.
- Since the centre hinge incorporates the actuating
arm of the aileron jack, the outboard arm of the aileron
would have responded in the normal way to control
column deflections, contributing effectively to the
lateral control available to the pilot.
The control problem
Although the left aileron was intact and the remaining
section of the right aileron was contributing to
effective lateral control, the pilot of A94-355 still had a
control problem. From the damage to the leader's
aircraft and from scrape and scoring marks on the
undersurface of the wingtip of A94-355 it was clear
that the major forces of the collision acted on an area
of the aircraft's right wing, behind a line approximately
joining the centre aileron hinge and the pitot head. The
impact resulted in distortion of the wing behind that
outboard section of the aileron were bent up, thus
placing the section of the wing at a marked negative
angle of incidence. This, effectively, would have
produced a powerful rolling tendency to the right.
Both members of the formation who saw the collision
commented on the aircraft's rapid roll to the right. It is
highly probable that the pilot, on sighting the lead
aircraft so close, or on feeling the impact, instinctively
pulled back on the control column to break away. This
would have produced a sudden increase in angle of
attack and, because of the damaged tip of the
starboard wing, would have increased the lift
differential between the left and right wings (provided
they were not stalled). The end result would have been
a powerful tendency to the right. This would explain
the rapid roll which placed the aircraft in the inverted
position before the pilot was able to correct.
At this point, it is considered that the accident pilot
moved the control column forward, in the belief that
the rapid roll was induced by a stall or flick. This would
result in a reduced rate of roll and, by the time the
aircraft was approaching the upright position, he was
able to check the roll with the left aileron.
That this would be possible, even with the damage
believed to have resulted from the collision, had been
demonstrated in previous instances of Sabre collisions.
That the pilot was able to stop the roll is borne out by
No 4's statement and by several ground observers
witnesses stated that the aircraft was either "gliding
down" or appeared to be attempting a landing.
Pilot's attempted ejection
While the accident pilot's aircraft was badly damaged
ion the collision, it should have been controllable,
confirmed by the fact that the pilot did regain control
for a brief period before crashing. Examination showed
that the engine was operating normally at higher that
6000 rpm immediately prior to impact. Why then, was
the pilot unable to retain control of the aircraft and
gain height for a safe ejection?
Given time to consider his actions, or experience to
temper his judgment, a pilot in this situation should
have survived. The accident pilot had very little of
both. Having regained some control over the aircraft,
he was most concerned about the continued difficulty
in maintaining level flight. Opening the throttle once
level flight was attained was almost automatic. Up to
this point his attention would have been directed
entirely towards achieving a safe attitude, but once
level, he probably glanced out at the "heavy" starboard
wing and saw the damaged wingtip and the sizeable
gap in the trailing edge.
Realising for the first time that the aircraft was
seriously damaged and suspecting what control he had
could fail at any second, the pilot might have thought
that ejection offered the best chance for survival. At
this point, he released the controls and tried to eject
by raising both seat handles; however the aircraft
rolled rapidly to the right and the right wing struck the
The condition of the ejection seat supports this
probability. Both seat handles were fully up and locked.
The canopy breaker bolt and spring were found out of
the breaker frame, both bent in a manner consistent
with their having been on the way out of their casing
as the aircraft rolled to the inverted position and
crashed onto the canopy.
Having elected to try and eject, the pilot had hold of
both firing handles by the time the aircraft first struck
the ground. Either from sheer desperation, or as a
result of the crash forces, he continued the action
of pulling the handles to the fully up position. While this
was happening, the aircraft continued to roll to the
inverted position and crashed onto the canopy
as the breaker bolt and spring were clearing their
casing. By the time the main initiators fired, the main
initiator hose had separated from the M-5 catapult,
and the seat firing sequence was interrupted.
What went wrong?
From the evidence of the pilots of the No3 and No 4
aircraft in the formation, it became apparent that in
attempting to move quickly from his low level battle
formation position into echelon right (the briefed
position when box formation was called), the accident
pilot misjudged his overtake, and was embarrassed by a
marked overshoot - not an unusual occurrence - even
with experienced pilots. For an inexperienced pilot,
possibly overawed by his first appearance in a public
display, and anxious to impress by demonstrating his
ability to move quickly from one formation position to
another, it represents an error of judgment.
In a situation where the leader does not have speed
brakes extended, such an overshoot is usually quite
easily corrected with speed brakes and/or by reducing
power. In this case however, the leader had his speed
brakes extended and had reduced power in order to
slow down and lower the undercarriage for the final
flypast in box formation. To correct an overshoot in this
situation, with no drag differential and only a small
power differential between the leader and the
overtaking aircraft, required some form of lateral
manoeuvring to enable the overshooting aircraft to fall
back while washing off excess airspeed.
The evidence suggests that the accident pilot decided
to cross to the left side and back to the right side to
correct the overshoot. In doing so he elected to cross
over, rather than under, his leader's flight path. This
is a highly dangerous practice, in that the pilot loses
sight of the lead aircraft when manoeuvring close to it,
and was contrary to the established technique taught
at the unit, which required the wingman to manoeuvre
with his leader in sight at all times.
Two factors which must be considered as having
contributed to the accident are the pilot's inexperience,
and the fact that he had been airborne on a low level
formation flying sortie for an hour when the collision
occurred. It is an established fact that an
inexperienced pilot tires more rapidly than an
experienced pilot when engaged in missions requiring
continued concentration, such as formation flying. The
experienced pilot can relax more readily and his reflexes
respond more or less automatically. The less
experienced pilot must retain concentration at a higher
level and does not relax readily. This could explain the
lapse which caused the pilot to lose sight of
The pilot of A94-355 used an incorrect technique to
correct an earlier error of judgment when joining up
with his leader into echelon right formation. As a result,
he lost sight of the other aircraft and, instead of
pulling well clear, tried to judge the relative position of
the other aircraft and dropped his right wing to check
visually. As a result, his right aileron struck the top of
the lead aircraft's wing.
The damage to the lead aircraft was relatively slight
and the leader was able to land safely. However, as a
result of the damage to the right wing and aileron of
A94-355, the pilot lost control of the aircraft which
rolled rapidly to the right and descended to a very low
altitude. The pilot then regained control of the aircraft
and, either from sheer panic or because of difficulties,
decided to eject. When he released the controls to
operate both seat firing handles, the aircraft rolled
rapidly to the right and impacted the ground before the
ejection sequence was completed. In any case, the
altitude at which he decided to eject precluded any
chance of success, had the seat successfully cleared
Two factors which contributed to the accident were
the pilot's inexperience, and fatigue from the relatively
long period he had been flying at low level in formation
before the collision occurred.
The tragedy of such an accident is made all the more
bitter because both the collision and the loss of the
pilot resulted from his own mistakes. Almost any other
course of action would have given him a greater
chance of survival. Sufficient power and control was
available to permit as climb to a safe ejection altitude.
On the other hand, the pilot could well have walked
away from the aircraft had he elected to make a
controlled crash landing straight ahead.
No doubt the pilot did make the wrong decision at the
critical time but, considering the circumstances, who
can blame him?
Have You Ever Wondered About the Histories of Those Old Planes on TV? - Gordon B
Sometime ago I was watching a TV show,..I think
hosted and directed by Jeff Watson, on Sir F.Sidney
Cotton regarding his pre-war efforts of British Strategic
reconnaissance prior to, and early World War Two. I
was amazed to findout that he was an Australian.
Unfortunately I didn't get to see the last 20 minutes.
Being the curious type, I decided to research the
The Story goes back to 1938 when the war clouds
were gathering in Europe, when under F.W.
Winterbotham, (an ex-SqnLdr who pioneered RAF Aerial
Photo reconnaissance in WW1) who was now the Chief
of Air, Directorate of the Secret Inteligence Service
(SIS) was becoming increasingly aware of the short fall
of Anglo-French aerial reconnaissance of the period.
This resulted in late 1938, with the SIS, the French
Secret Service, the American Armament Corporation,
and a Business Associate of the latter, Mr F.S. Cotton
to negotiate forming a special reconnaissance system
to fulfil their needs. Cotton's background, an ex-Royal
Naval Aviation Service Pilot in World War 1, and his
subsequent post war aviation experiences of flying all
over Europe regularly, made him a prominent figure in
A private company, Aeronautical Research and Sales
Corporation was formed as a cover to conceal its true
endeavours in 1939, and a Lockheed 12A was ordered
from the USA.
After assembly in the UK, it was used for several cross
border flights to the Ruhr, Italy and North Africa
between 25th March to 25th April 1939. No further
History could be found on its identity or use.
Two further Lockheed 12A's were purchased, one being
handed over to the French( no further details found)
and the other extensively modified for use by Cotton.
Built as a Lockheed 12A, this particular a/c, c/n1203,
was delivered to Continental Oil Company on the 1st
October 1936 for use by its subsidiary company,
Horchbach Drilling Company. During March 1939,
Cotton, under the auspices cover of the British Airways
Ltd (not the BA of today) purchased it. It arrived on
the 24/04/39 in the UK for assembly by Cunliffe-Owen
Aircraft Ltd at Eastleigh in Southampton. What was
peculiar to the final finish, was the colour,.......duck
egg green, later used on those PRU Spitfires.
On the 15th of May, 1939 she was issued with a
Certificate of Registration, #9098, and became G-AFTL
on the register. Following the acceptance, she was
returned to Airwork Ltd at Heston to have her "Special
Mods" done. These included two extra 70 Gallon tanks
to increase her range from 700 miles to 1600 miles, plus
the installation of three RAF F24 Cameras. One was
mounted vertically, with the other two mounted 40
degrees offset in the fuselage so that at an altitude of
21000 feet, it could provide overlapping images up to
11 miles on its trek.
Much has been written on its service use, albeit short,
but it culminated on the night of the 19th September
1940 when the Luftwaffe dropped parachute mines on
the Hanger at Heston. Due to the extensive damage
she suffered, she was crated up and shipped to
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at Burbank, California the
following month. Surviving U-Boats, she emerged after
her re-build there on the 21st November 1942 with the
export registration of NX21707, to be flown from Miami
Florida, to her new owner in the British Honduras,
Lowell Yerex as VP-TAI.
She was purchased by British West Indian Airways on
the 5th January 1943 and used up till April 1948, when
it was purchased by Dan Hartman of Florida USA. She
After several owners in the States, she became N12EJ
in 1991 when she was bought by Steve Oliver of
Oregon. It's still there today,.......and guess
what,....it's for sale at only for a mere US $425000.00
Aviation History bickering!!!!!
HAVE YOU SEEN THIS LOCKHEED ON TV OR IN THE
YES, YOU HAVE!
Doc Savage TV series
The Amelia Earhart Story
The Howard Hughes Story
The "A" Team
Got a spare $425,000 for this plane?
A trip down Memory Lane...
For many RAAF personnel posted (sentenced?) to RAAF
Laverton, the first thing they saw at the entrance to
the RAAF base was Meteor A77-702.
I wonder how many ever wondered what its former life
had been? A77-702 originally started life as A77-305.
It was delivered to 77 Sqn in Japan via the HMS Warrior
on 8 Jan 1951 and changed to its present serial in
1952. It served with 91 Wing and 78 Wing and on 14
February 1956, received damage to the port engine and
fuselage at Williamtown. After a stint at 23 Sqn, the
aircraft served with 38 Sqn Communications Flight. In
1960 and 1961, approval was requested for its
disposal. In 1963 a request was submitted for its
conversion to a fire fighting aid or as an exhibit for
RAAF Laverton. In July 1963, its fate was sealed when
approval was given for its conversion to an instruction
aid. The engines were to be converted to instructional
aids for the Melbourne University Sqn.
The image shows it standing sentinel at RAAF Laverton
in 1971. On 14 September 1971, the aircraft was
moved from Laverton to Point Cook for display at the
We would like to hear from anyone that can fill us in
on its activities especially between 1963 and 1971
Please Email firstname.lastname@example.org
Click to see A77-702
Neptune Modifications - SARAH revealed!
SARAH was a device designed to assist with Search
and Rescue and believed to stand for Search and
Rescue and Homing. Originally a British invention, The
crew's mae wests were fitted with a battery (semi-
circular to fit body abt 5-7") on the right hand side
and a beacon in a special pocket on the left hand side.
An aerial shot up from this beacon and the downed
crew could transmit and receive messages. There were
four different coloured beacons with different pulses
(frequencies) so that the searchers could identify a
particular crew member. Aircraft were fitted with
transmitter/receivers that allowed them to talk to the
The aircraft status cards would imply that not all
aircraftwere fitted with SARAH although this may be
just another gap in the cards. What they do state is
that the fitment of SARAH to some aircraft was
temporary. The status cards for the P2V-7s associate
Mod 246 with the fitment of SARAH so perhaps all of
the P2V-7s had SARAH although not all of the cards
record the mod.
Thanks to Reg Owen, Wynnum Graham and Ron Cuskelly
for their input.
ADF Serials New Members
We would like to welcome two new members of the ADF
serials team. Graham Higgs - who is assisting with
images and Ron Wynn who is working on the A-8
Can you help us identify this Anson?
Does anyone have any information about this Anson's
military history? It's civil registration is VH-FIA. If you
can please email email@example.com
Click here to see image of VH-FIA
We value the feedback of the people who visit our
website and those who read this newsletter, if you
would like to tell us what you think of the website or
newsletter please click on the link below.
: Feedback on ADF Serials Website
Roy Nixon passed on the following:
Many thanks Dean for your help re.S/L PA Dey.I will
pass this on to P/O Ewans 276ASR sqn who will be most
interested. What a splendid user friendly site. I cannot
wait to return!
[Sqn Leader Phillip Alexander Dey and the crew of
Beaufort A9-625 were killed on 16 March 1945 when
their aircraft exploded in mid-air, But West New Guinea]
Don Clark submitted the followng comments.
Subject: Feedback on ADF Serials Website
Comments: Revisiting this site after some time, I'm
once more impressed with how well organised,
comprehensive and accessible it is. This is a
really valuable resource, reflecting a lot of work behind
the scenes. Thank you very much indeed.
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