ADF Serials Newsletter
For those interested in Australian Military Aircraft History and Serials

January 2003
in this issue
-- Sabres in RAAF Service - a brief history
-- Indonesian Sabres (ex RAAF) Can you help?
-- SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 1 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
-- SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 2 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
-- Have You Ever Wondered About the Histories of Those Old Planes on TV? - Gordon B
-- A trip down Memory Lane...
-- Neptune Modifications - SARAH revealed!
-- ADF Serials New Members
-- Can you help us identify this Anson?
-- Your Feedback
-- Do you have something for us?

Welcome to our first newsletter for 2003. This month the newsletter features the Sabre aircraft with a short history of its service with the RAAF, a request for information on one of the RAAF Sabres which was sold to the Indonesian Air Force in 1973 and an accident report involving Sabre aircraft at Quirindi NSW.

Gordon B looks at the Lockheed 12A, Sidney Cotton's role in reconnaissance and ends with a section on plane spotting from the comfort of your lounge chair.

There is also a walk down Memory Lane - many RAAF bases and parks have old RAAF aircraft as static displays? Have you looked at one and wondered about its history? Wynnum has provided a photo of Meteor A77-702 which was displayed outside RAAF Laverton during the 1960's and 1970's.

If you have a photo of any military aircraft on static display please email jan_adf-serials.com and we can included it in the newsletter.

Last month's newsletter contained a plea about information re SARAH. Read on to see who or what Sarah was.

The group also needs assistance in finding out more about Anson VH-FIA. Can you help with details of its military life?

Till next month Jan

Sabres in RAAF Service - a brief history
The Sabre aircraft was brought into service with the RAAF in 1955. The decision to replace the locally built CAC Mustang and DHA Vampires with the Sabre was based on its success against Russian MiG aircraft during the Korean War. As there were no spare Sabres to supply to the RAAF, the CAC was commissioned to build them under licence. The locally built Sabre, based on the design of the North American F86 Sabre, was modified to suit local conditions. Some of the modifications included:

  • The installation of Rolls Royce Avon turbojet engines and modified air intakes to accommodate the larger engine
  • Revised cockpit layout
  • Increased fuel capacity
  • Installation of two 30mm cannons under the cockpit instead of 6 0.5 calibre machine guns mounted around the nose

The first Australian built Avon Sabre flew on 3 August 1953 and during its test flight, it became the first aircraft in Australia to break the sound barrier. 75 Sqn, reformed in March 1955, took delivery of its Sabre aircraft on 4 Apr 1955 at RAAF Williamtown. 3 Sqn received its first Sabres on 1 March 1956 and 77 Sqn on 19 November 1956. During the Malayan Emergency, Sabres saw service in Malaysia with 3 Sqn deployed in 1958 and 77 Sqn in 1959. Sabres flew missions against the communist insurgents until 1960. In 1962, a detachment (later designated 79 Sqn) of 8 Sabres deployed from Butterworth to Ubon (Thailand) to assist with action against communist activity. During their period of service with the RAAF, the Sabre flew with 2OCU, 5OCU, ARDU, 3, 75, 76, 77 and 79 Sqns. The Sabre aircraft were used by the Black Panther aerobatic team and to many, they are still widely regarded as the best combat aircraft produced in Australia. [Nothing beats the Mirage in my humble opinion, Editor] In 1965 the phasing out of Sabre aircraft began as the RAAF took delivery of the Mirage III-A. By July 1971, the RAAF had officially retired the Sabre from service. However, many of the Sabres continued life with other airforces. In October 1969, ten Sabres were handed over to the Royal Malaysian Air Force, with a further six delivered in 1971. Additionally, in February 1973, 16 Sabres entered service with the Indonesian Air Force. Which leads us to....

Indonesian Sabres (ex RAAF) Can you help?
Darren is looking for information on the Former RAAF ID of the Indonesian Sabre F8623 (link to image below) and others. If you can help please email darren@adf-serials.com

Click here to see image of F8623

SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 1 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
SABRE MIDAIR COLLISION Quirindi Airfield, NSW 19 September 1964
(Article reproduced courtesy of Directorate of Flying Safety-Air Force with special thanks to Mr John Crawley) At 1300 hrs on the 19th September 1964, four Sabre aircraft of No 2 (Fighter) Operational Conversion Unit, based at RAAF Williamtown, took off on a "round robin" flypast exercise planned as part of Air Force Week celebrations. The planned route was to take them over nine NSW towns, including Quirindi airfield and township, prior to returning to Williamtown. Arrival at Quirindi was planned to coincide with a local air pageant and would involve a number of flypasts in various formations as part of the pageant.

The mission proceeded as planned to Quirindi (the fifth town) where the briefed flypasts, in different formations, was begun. At about 1403 hrs, after completing a pass in box formation and two passes in low level battle formation, the aircraft were called into close formation for the final flypast.

While rejoining into close formation the No 2 aircraft, A94-355 collided with the lead aircraft, A94-356. The No 2 aircraft impacted the ground five seconds after the collision killing the pilot. The lead aircraft was only slightly damaged and landed safely at Tamworth. The remainder of the formation returned directly to Williamtown.

The flight was one of a number of commitments accepted by the RAAF as a part of Air Force Week. However, because of urgent, unexpected operational tasks that has arisen since accepting the flypast commitment, No 2 (F)OCU lacked sufficient staff pilots to fly all the Air Force Week missions as well as routine training exercises. It was thus decided to utilise two student members of the senior conversion course in the flypast mission, to make up the required section of four aircraft. One of those selected was an experienced pilot with previous Sabre experience, who was deemed to be the most capable of the remaining pilots on the course.

At the briefing, all flight members were issued with prepared maps of the proposed route. All relevant details, such as route to be flown, timing, anticipated fuel consumption, reporting procedures etc were covered.

Considerable emphasis was placed on the two types of formation to be flown - low level battle formation and close box formation.

The sequence to be flown over Quirindi consisted of a flypast at 500 ft AGL in a box formation, spreading into a low level battle formation for further passes over the airfield, reforming again into box formation with wheels down for a final pass, and then departure for Scone. The leader briefed that all power changes, formation changes, turns, use of speed brakes, and undercarriage selections would be called over the radio. A blackboard diagram was used to illustrate the types of formation, positions of members in the formation, and movement of the members of the formation during turns.

Duration of the flight was expected to be 1.25 hrs. The weather conditions prevailing at Quirindi for the flypasts were mainly cloudless, light winds, light turbulence and good visibility.

Aircrew : Formation Leader: an experienced Sabre pilot with in excess of 1 000 hrs on type. He was also an FCI. No 2: The pilot of the No 2 (accident) aircraft had accumulated 307 hrs total flying time, including 48 hrs on Sabre aircraft. He had been repeatedly assessed as an outstanding cadet during his basic training and won the Goble Trophy for best overall pilot on his course. During the Sabre operational conversion course he had exhibited a great deal of natural ability and determination. He had made good progress throughout the course, having completed the pure conversion segment, and was coping quite well with the more advanced tactics phase. He had successfully covered all aspects of tactical and close formation flying with only minor faults.

The accident: The accident occurred two miles from Quirindi airfield and was witnessed by some 2500 spectators at Quirindi airfield, as well as CAA officials and others involved in the organising of the local pageant. Other witnesses closer to the crash location, include two other members of the formation.

The pilot of the lead aircraft stated that as he passed over the airfield on the second pass, he called for speed brakes out. He was then level and also called that he was reducing power. Shortly after, while in a gentle 20 degree bank to starboard and climbing away gradually, he called for "box formation go".

The leader was, by now, looking out generally, in anticipation of initiating a left turn for the final pass over the airfield. Suddenly he felt a noticeable bump on his port wing and observed a shadow in his peripheral vision. No alterations to the aircraft's handling characteristics were noted.

Following a query from the No 3 aircraft, the leader looked out at the port wing and confirmed that he had been hit. On steepening up to the starboard, he saw wreckage of A94-355 on the ground.

The pilot of the No 4 aircraft was the furthest pilot in the formation from the two aircraft involved in the collision, some 200 feet directly astern of his leader. Nevertheless, he had the best view of the two aircraft involved. He stated that moments earlier both he and the accident pilot had delayed opening of speed brakes to assist in catching up to the lead aircraft. Then, while he (No 4) had begun to regulate his closing on the lead aircraft, the No 2 aircraft had maintained a considerable closing speed. The pilot of the lead aircraft had, by this time, started a gentle turn to starboard and No 2 overshot his leader and appeared to pass slightly in front of and above the lead aircraft. It appeared to No 4 that No 2 was taking his aircraft to the outside of the turn to wash off excess overtake. No 2 then banked sharply to starboard and his starboard wingtip hit the leader's left wing.

According to the No 4 pilot, while the lead aircraft maintained its flight path and appeared to be unaffected by the collision, the No 2 aircraft yawed sharply to the right, slightly above and in front of the lead aircraft, and about four feet of the right wing tip broke off with other parts also shredding from the damaged wing. The aircraft then rolled very rapidly to the right and passed underneath the lead aircraft. As it fell away from the formation it quickly became inverted, with the nose pointing down.

At this point No 4 briefly lost sight of No 2. When re- acquired the aircraft was flying straight and level approximately 20 degrees to the left of the formation heading and about 10 feet above ground level, in a slightly nose up attitude, yawing slightly and travelling parallel with the ground. It seemed that it was about to land and, just when it appeared to be touching down, it rolled rapidly to the right and impacted the ground on its right wing.

The pilot of the No 3 aircraft generally confirmed this sequence of events. Some 30 seconds after the call to rejoin for box formation, he was moving into the echelon left position when he noticed No 2 come quickly into view almost immediately above the lead aircraft. It was banked to starboard at an angle of about 90 degrees. At this time the lead aircraft was in a climbing turn to starboard. No 2 then appeared to roll rapidly, slightly in front of the lead aircraft and so close that No 3 thought their wings may have touched. Moments later, the No 2 aircraft went inverted and passed from view.

After A94-355 impacted the ground, progressively disintegration of the right wing occurred and a fire started soon after. The aircraft rolled inverted onto the canopy area, before rolling and tumbling along the ground.

Distribution of the wreckage was quite random and simply indicated a high degree of disintegration and dispersion due to speed at impact, the initial impact angle and the rolling/tumbling progress of the aircraft along the ground.

There was ample evidence to show that, in the final moments, the pilot attempted ejection.

SABRE Mid Air Collision Part 2 - John Crawley and Dean Norman
Wreckage examination From impact marks on the ground, the degree of break- up of A94-355 and the distribution of the wreckage, it was apparent that the right wing tip had initial contacted the ground at fairly high speed and a low rate of descent. The wreckage was spread along a path 300 metres long.

As is sometimes the case in accident investigations, physical evidence at the crash site conflicted with what was given by eyewitnesses. In this instance, the evidence of the No 4 pilot regarding a significant part of A94-355's right wing separating after the midair collision was not consistent with the evidence obtained during the wreckage inspection. The starboard wing, including the tip and outer section of the aileron were still attached to the aircraft when it impacted the ground.

In order to establish exactly what damage was inflicted on A94-355 by the collision, and to what extent effective control could have been maintained by the pilot, all the recovered portions of the right wing were collected and reconstructed. From this reconstruction, it was established amongst other things, that:

  • The right mainplane, flap and aileron, with the exception of that part of the aileron inboard of the aileron centre hinge and aileron jack, were still attached to the aircraft when it crashed.
  • Neither the aileron jack nor the hydraulic lines of either the normal or alternate control systems to the jack were damaged by the collision.
  • Since the centre hinge incorporates the actuating arm of the aileron jack, the outboard arm of the aileron would have responded in the normal way to control column deflections, contributing effectively to the lateral control available to the pilot.

The control problem Although the left aileron was intact and the remaining section of the right aileron was contributing to effective lateral control, the pilot of A94-355 still had a control problem. From the damage to the leader's aircraft and from scrape and scoring marks on the undersurface of the wingtip of A94-355 it was clear that the major forces of the collision acted on an area of the aircraft's right wing, behind a line approximately joining the centre aileron hinge and the pitot head. The impact resulted in distortion of the wing behind that outboard section of the aileron were bent up, thus placing the section of the wing at a marked negative angle of incidence. This, effectively, would have produced a powerful rolling tendency to the right.

Both members of the formation who saw the collision commented on the aircraft's rapid roll to the right. It is highly probable that the pilot, on sighting the lead aircraft so close, or on feeling the impact, instinctively pulled back on the control column to break away. This would have produced a sudden increase in angle of attack and, because of the damaged tip of the starboard wing, would have increased the lift differential between the left and right wings (provided they were not stalled). The end result would have been a powerful tendency to the right. This would explain the rapid roll which placed the aircraft in the inverted position before the pilot was able to correct.

At this point, it is considered that the accident pilot moved the control column forward, in the belief that the rapid roll was induced by a stall or flick. This would result in a reduced rate of roll and, by the time the aircraft was approaching the upright position, he was able to check the roll with the left aileron.

That this would be possible, even with the damage believed to have resulted from the collision, had been demonstrated in previous instances of Sabre collisions. That the pilot was able to stop the roll is borne out by No 4's statement and by several ground observers witnesses stated that the aircraft was either "gliding down" or appeared to be attempting a landing.

Pilot's attempted ejection While the accident pilot's aircraft was badly damaged ion the collision, it should have been controllable, confirmed by the fact that the pilot did regain control for a brief period before crashing. Examination showed that the engine was operating normally at higher that 6000 rpm immediately prior to impact. Why then, was the pilot unable to retain control of the aircraft and gain height for a safe ejection?

Given time to consider his actions, or experience to temper his judgment, a pilot in this situation should have survived. The accident pilot had very little of both. Having regained some control over the aircraft, he was most concerned about the continued difficulty in maintaining level flight. Opening the throttle once level flight was attained was almost automatic. Up to this point his attention would have been directed entirely towards achieving a safe attitude, but once level, he probably glanced out at the "heavy" starboard wing and saw the damaged wingtip and the sizeable gap in the trailing edge.

Realising for the first time that the aircraft was seriously damaged and suspecting what control he had could fail at any second, the pilot might have thought that ejection offered the best chance for survival. At this point, he released the controls and tried to eject by raising both seat handles; however the aircraft rolled rapidly to the right and the right wing struck the ground.

The condition of the ejection seat supports this probability. Both seat handles were fully up and locked. The canopy breaker bolt and spring were found out of the breaker frame, both bent in a manner consistent with their having been on the way out of their casing as the aircraft rolled to the inverted position and crashed onto the canopy.

Having elected to try and eject, the pilot had hold of both firing handles by the time the aircraft first struck the ground. Either from sheer desperation, or as a result of the crash forces, he continued the action of pulling the handles to the fully up position. While this was happening, the aircraft continued to roll to the inverted position and crashed onto the canopy as the breaker bolt and spring were clearing their casing. By the time the main initiators fired, the main initiator hose had separated from the M-5 catapult, and the seat firing sequence was interrupted.

What went wrong? From the evidence of the pilots of the No3 and No 4 aircraft in the formation, it became apparent that in attempting to move quickly from his low level battle formation position into echelon right (the briefed position when box formation was called), the accident pilot misjudged his overtake, and was embarrassed by a marked overshoot - not an unusual occurrence - even with experienced pilots. For an inexperienced pilot, possibly overawed by his first appearance in a public display, and anxious to impress by demonstrating his ability to move quickly from one formation position to another, it represents an error of judgment.

In a situation where the leader does not have speed brakes extended, such an overshoot is usually quite easily corrected with speed brakes and/or by reducing power. In this case however, the leader had his speed brakes extended and had reduced power in order to slow down and lower the undercarriage for the final flypast in box formation. To correct an overshoot in this situation, with no drag differential and only a small power differential between the leader and the overtaking aircraft, required some form of lateral manoeuvring to enable the overshooting aircraft to fall back while washing off excess airspeed.

The evidence suggests that the accident pilot decided to cross to the left side and back to the right side to correct the overshoot. In doing so he elected to cross over, rather than under, his leader's flight path. This is a highly dangerous practice, in that the pilot loses sight of the lead aircraft when manoeuvring close to it, and was contrary to the established technique taught at the unit, which required the wingman to manoeuvre with his leader in sight at all times.

Two factors which must be considered as having contributed to the accident are the pilot's inexperience, and the fact that he had been airborne on a low level formation flying sortie for an hour when the collision occurred. It is an established fact that an inexperienced pilot tires more rapidly than an experienced pilot when engaged in missions requiring continued concentration, such as formation flying. The experienced pilot can relax more readily and his reflexes respond more or less automatically. The less experienced pilot must retain concentration at a higher level and does not relax readily. This could explain the lapse which caused the pilot to lose sight of his leader.

Summary The pilot of A94-355 used an incorrect technique to correct an earlier error of judgment when joining up with his leader into echelon right formation. As a result, he lost sight of the other aircraft and, instead of pulling well clear, tried to judge the relative position of the other aircraft and dropped his right wing to check visually. As a result, his right aileron struck the top of the lead aircraft's wing.

The damage to the lead aircraft was relatively slight and the leader was able to land safely. However, as a result of the damage to the right wing and aileron of A94-355, the pilot lost control of the aircraft which rolled rapidly to the right and descended to a very low altitude. The pilot then regained control of the aircraft and, either from sheer panic or because of difficulties, decided to eject. When he released the controls to operate both seat firing handles, the aircraft rolled rapidly to the right and impacted the ground before the ejection sequence was completed. In any case, the altitude at which he decided to eject precluded any chance of success, had the seat successfully cleared the aircraft.

Two factors which contributed to the accident were the pilot's inexperience, and fatigue from the relatively long period he had been flying at low level in formation before the collision occurred.

The tragedy of such an accident is made all the more bitter because both the collision and the loss of the pilot resulted from his own mistakes. Almost any other course of action would have given him a greater chance of survival. Sufficient power and control was available to permit as climb to a safe ejection altitude. On the other hand, the pilot could well have walked away from the aircraft had he elected to make a controlled crash landing straight ahead.

No doubt the pilot did make the wrong decision at the critical time but, considering the circumstances, who can blame him?

Have You Ever Wondered About the Histories of Those Old Planes on TV? - Gordon B
Sometime ago I was watching a TV show,..I think hosted and directed by Jeff Watson, on Sir F.Sidney Cotton regarding his pre-war efforts of British Strategic reconnaissance prior to, and early World War Two. I was amazed to findout that he was an Australian. Unfortunately I didn't get to see the last 20 minutes. Being the curious type, I decided to research the subject.

The Story goes back to 1938 when the war clouds were gathering in Europe, when under F.W. Winterbotham, (an ex-SqnLdr who pioneered RAF Aerial Photo reconnaissance in WW1) who was now the Chief of Air, Directorate of the Secret Inteligence Service (SIS) was becoming increasingly aware of the short fall of Anglo-French aerial reconnaissance of the period. This resulted in late 1938, with the SIS, the French Secret Service, the American Armament Corporation, and a Business Associate of the latter, Mr F.S. Cotton to negotiate forming a special reconnaissance system to fulfil their needs. Cotton's background, an ex-Royal Naval Aviation Service Pilot in World War 1, and his subsequent post war aviation experiences of flying all over Europe regularly, made him a prominent figure in this collaboration.

A private company, Aeronautical Research and Sales Corporation was formed as a cover to conceal its true endeavours in 1939, and a Lockheed 12A was ordered from the USA.

After assembly in the UK, it was used for several cross border flights to the Ruhr, Italy and North Africa between 25th March to 25th April 1939. No further History could be found on its identity or use.

Two further Lockheed 12A's were purchased, one being handed over to the French( no further details found) and the other extensively modified for use by Cotton.

Built as a Lockheed 12A, this particular a/c, c/n1203, was delivered to Continental Oil Company on the 1st October 1936 for use by its subsidiary company, Horchbach Drilling Company. During March 1939, Cotton, under the auspices cover of the British Airways Ltd (not the BA of today) purchased it. It arrived on the 24/04/39 in the UK for assembly by Cunliffe-Owen Aircraft Ltd at Eastleigh in Southampton. What was peculiar to the final finish, was the colour,.......duck egg green, later used on those PRU Spitfires.

On the 15th of May, 1939 she was issued with a Certificate of Registration, #9098, and became G-AFTL on the register. Following the acceptance, she was returned to Airwork Ltd at Heston to have her "Special Mods" done. These included two extra 70 Gallon tanks to increase her range from 700 miles to 1600 miles, plus the installation of three RAF F24 Cameras. One was mounted vertically, with the other two mounted 40 degrees offset in the fuselage so that at an altitude of 21000 feet, it could provide overlapping images up to 11 miles on its trek.

Much has been written on its service use, albeit short, but it culminated on the night of the 19th September 1940 when the Luftwaffe dropped parachute mines on the Hanger at Heston. Due to the extensive damage she suffered, she was crated up and shipped to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at Burbank, California the following month. Surviving U-Boats, she emerged after her re-build there on the 21st November 1942 with the export registration of NX21707, to be flown from Miami Florida, to her new owner in the British Honduras, Lowell Yerex as VP-TAI.

She was purchased by British West Indian Airways on the 5th January 1943 and used up till April 1948, when it was purchased by Dan Hartman of Florida USA. She became N1161V.

After several owners in the States, she became N12EJ in 1991 when she was bought by Steve Oliver of Oregon. It's still there today,.......and guess what,....it's for sale at only for a mere US $425000.00


Doc Savage TV series The Amelia Earhart Story The Howard Hughes Story Moonlighting Spencer's Pilots The "A" Team

Got a spare $425,000 for this plane?

A trip down Memory Lane...
For many RAAF personnel posted (sentenced?) to RAAF Laverton, the first thing they saw at the entrance to the RAAF base was Meteor A77-702. I wonder how many ever wondered what its former life had been? A77-702 originally started life as A77-305. It was delivered to 77 Sqn in Japan via the HMS Warrior on 8 Jan 1951 and changed to its present serial in 1952. It served with 91 Wing and 78 Wing and on 14 February 1956, received damage to the port engine and fuselage at Williamtown. After a stint at 23 Sqn, the aircraft served with 38 Sqn Communications Flight. In 1960 and 1961, approval was requested for its disposal. In 1963 a request was submitted for its conversion to a fire fighting aid or as an exhibit for RAAF Laverton. In July 1963, its fate was sealed when approval was given for its conversion to an instruction aid. The engines were to be converted to instructional aids for the Melbourne University Sqn. The image shows it standing sentinel at RAAF Laverton in 1971. On 14 September 1971, the aircraft was moved from Laverton to Point Cook for display at the RAAF Museum.

We would like to hear from anyone that can fill us in on its activities especially between 1963 and 1971 Please Email jan@adf-serials.com

Click to see A77-702

Neptune Modifications - SARAH revealed!
SARAH was a device designed to assist with Search and Rescue and believed to stand for Search and Rescue and Homing. Originally a British invention, The crew's mae wests were fitted with a battery (semi- circular to fit body abt 5-7") on the right hand side and a beacon in a special pocket on the left hand side. An aerial shot up from this beacon and the downed crew could transmit and receive messages. There were four different coloured beacons with different pulses (frequencies) so that the searchers could identify a particular crew member. Aircraft were fitted with transmitter/receivers that allowed them to talk to the downed crew. The aircraft status cards would imply that not all aircraftwere fitted with SARAH although this may be just another gap in the cards. What they do state is that the fitment of SARAH to some aircraft was temporary. The status cards for the P2V-7s associate Mod 246 with the fitment of SARAH so perhaps all of the P2V-7s had SARAH although not all of the cards record the mod. Thanks to Reg Owen, Wynnum Graham and Ron Cuskelly for their input.

ADF Serials New Members
We would like to welcome two new members of the ADF serials team. Graham Higgs - who is assisting with images and Ron Wynn who is working on the A-8 Beaufighter page.

Can you help us identify this Anson?
Does anyone have any information about this Anson's military history? It's civil registration is VH-FIA. If you can please email darren@adf-serials.com

Click here to see image of VH-FIA

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: Feedback on ADF Serials Website Roy Nixon passed on the following: Many thanks Dean for your help re.S/L PA Dey.I will pass this on to P/O Ewans 276ASR sqn who will be most interested. What a splendid user friendly site. I cannot wait to return!

[Sqn Leader Phillip Alexander Dey and the crew of Beaufort A9-625 were killed on 16 March 1945 when their aircraft exploded in mid-air, But West New Guinea]

Don Clark submitted the followng comments. Subject: Feedback on ADF Serials Website Comments: Revisiting this site after some time, I'm once more impressed with how well organised, comprehensive and accessible it is. This is a really valuable resource, reflecting a lot of work behind the scenes. Thank you very much indeed.

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